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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
RENICK v. BOYD.
Replevin will not lie at the common law by one out of possession of the realty
against one in adverse possession under a claim of title for the recovery of chattels
which have become such by severance from the realty.
Where a statute authorizes a recovery in replevin for timber, lumber, coal ", or
other property " severed from the realty, notwithstanding that the title to the land
is in dispute, the words " other property" must be construed to mean other property
ejusdema generis and do not include growing crops.

WRITS of error to the Court of Common Pleas of Chester
county.
Two actions of replevin by J. Renick against J. Boyd to recover
certain hay, oats and corn. Pleas, non cepit and property.
On the trial, before CLAYTON, P. J., the following facts appeared:
The plaintiff had bought from 'the administrator of one Correy,
certain land in Franklin township, Chester county, of which
defendant was in the actual possession. Defendant claimed the
land as his own, a'hd refused to give it up. Renick subsequently
took actual possession of a part of thb farm, and planted and
farmed it for a few months, but was forcibly dispossessed by defendant, who proceeded to harvest the crops. These actions were then
brought to recover the crops which had been harvested. Meanwhile, an ejectment for the land in question had been brought by
Renick against Boyd, and was pending at the trial of the replevin
suits in the court below.
The court charged the jury, inter azlia, as follows: 11Under te
evidence it clearly appears that at the time the grass, oats and
corn were cut and harvested, the defendant was in actual, adverse
possession of the land in dispute, by virtue of a claim of title;
and, according to law, an action for replevin will not lie, under
such circumstances, for the growing crops and products of
land. * * *
"The defendant being in possession under a claim of right
when the grass, oats and corn in dispute were cut and harvested, the
plaintiff's remedy is in an action for damages. He cannot recover
the thing itself, and your verdict should, therefore, be for the
defendant in both cases."
Verdicts for defendants and judgments thereon. Plaintiff took
these writs, assigning for error the charge of the court.
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William

. gays and A. P. Beid, for plaintiff in error.

. H. Pennypacker and,J. J. Gheen, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GREEN, J.-These were two actions of replevin brought to
recover certain hay, oats and corn, after the same had been harvested, upon land of which the defendant -was in the actual and
adverse possession both before and at the time the crops were
gathered. The plaintiff had brought an action of ejectment against
the defendant to recover possession of the land, and this action was
pending at the time the crops in question were severed from the
freehold. The plaintiff claims that he is entitled to recover in this
action under the provisions of the Act of May 15th 1871, P. L.
268. That act is as follows: " In all actions of replevin now
pending or hereafter brought to recover timber, lumber, coal or
other property severed 'from the realty, the plaintiff shall be
entitled to recover, notwithstanding the fact that the title to 'the
land from which said property was severed may be in dispute.
Provided said plaintiff shows title in himself at the time of severance."

The learned judge of the court below held that this act was not
intended to apply to the case of growing crops severed by the person in possession under' claim of title to the land on which the
crops were groWn. In'this opinion we concur. Prior to the pas'sage of the' act' in question, it had always been held that replevin
would not lie by one out of possession to recover against one in
possession and claiming title, for any kind of chattels which had
become such, by severance from the freehold, of which they had
previously formed a part. Thus, in Brown v. Caldwell, 10 S. &R.
i14, it was held, that replevin does not lie by one not in the actual
exclusive possession of land, whatever title he may claim, against
one who is in the actual, visible, notorious, exclusive possession
and occupation thereof, claiming the right for slates taken out of a
quarry on the land.
In Powell v. Smith, 2 Watts 126, in the application of the
same doctrine, we held that replevin would not lie to recover -fixtures separated and removed from a mill.' On page 127, GIBSO'N,
C. J., said: "The principle which is to govern this case was settled
in Mather 'v. Trinity Church, 3 S. & R. 509; Baker v.Howell,
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6 Id. 476, and Brown v. Caldtcll, 10 Id. 114, in which it was
determined, on principle and authority, that the right of property
in a chattel which has become such by severance from the freehold
cannot be determined in a transitory action by the trial of the title
to the freehold, because the title to land might otherwise be tried
out of the county.
"An action of trover or replevin for such a chattel, therefore, does
not lie by a plaintiff out of possession. * * * Independent of this
technical inhibitory principle, which, however, is decisive, it would
provoke much useless litigation, and be attended with great practical mnischief, if an owner out of possession were suffered to harass
the actual occupant with an action for every blade of grass cut, or
bushel of grain grown by him, instead of being compelled to resort
to the action for mesne profits, after a recovery in ejectment, by
which compensation for the whole injury may be had at one operation." Other authorities are to the same point.
The Act of 1871 has doubtless changed this rule, so far as it
relates to the particular forms of property there mentioned. These
are timber, lumber, coal and other 'property, severed from the
realty. It is claimed that growing crops come within the designation, " other property," and therefore that the act includes them
also., But a very slight consideration of the act shows not only
that they" are not expressly mentioned, but that they are not
necessarily implied under this general description. There are
many other forms of property besides timber, lumber and coal,
which constitute part of the realty.. Thus slate, marble, iron ore,
zinc ore and all other forms of minerals and ores in place, building
stone and fixtures, and machinery of every description, which
have been permanently affixed to the realty. To all of these the
expression "other property" in the act may well be applied.
They are of the same generic character with the other kinds of
property expressly mentioned. That is, they are a part of the
realty itself, and when converted into personalty, it is by an act of
severance, such as works a conversion of timber, lumber and coal.
Now growing crops are only ephemeral. They are produced not
by nature as a part of the land, but by the labor of man, combined with the operations of nature, and are never intended to
become permanently affixed to the freehold, but to be removed
from it at maturity. The very purpose of their cultivation is to
make them personalty. Hence, the spirit and meaning of the act
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in no sense requires that they should be considered in the same
category with such constituent elements of the earth as timber,
lumber and coal. In Allen's Appeal, 32 P. F. Smith 302, the
words of an act giving a preference for wages to persons employed
"in any works, mines, manufactory or other business," &c., were
construed to apply only to any other business, ejusdem qeneris.
The same rule of construction applied here would exclude growing
crops as not being of the same kind or class with those expressly
named in the act. We consider that the purpose of the act was to
remedy a different kind of evil which existed prior to its passage.
Formerly, when one in possession cut down standing timber, or
severed or removed coal, slate, ores or minerals from the realty,
the only remedy of the true owner was by the action for mesne
profits, or by estrepement or other proceeding to stay waste. But
these were not adequate, as the tenant in possession could make
way with and convert these articles, and being insolvent, a verdict
and judgment for damages, or a mere preventive order staying
future acts, furnished no sufficient relief, and we apprehend it was
the purpose of this act to remedy this class of wrongs. These
considerations are inapplicable, however, to the case of growing
crops. They are generally the fruits of the labor of the tenant in
possession, and it would be a most serious innovation upon the
existing state of the law, as well as a great hardship upon the
person in possession under claim of title, to subject him to a succession of actions for his various crops when harvested, and to the
necessity of trying complicated and vexatious questions of title to
land, in the determination of the ownership of his fruits, vegetables and crops.
Such a construction is not required by any reading of the act,
and is, therefore, not necessary to be made.
Judgment affirmed.
It is a well-settled rule of law that if
fixtures, timber trees, &c., constituting
during their annexation to the soil a
part of the realty, are tortiously severed
therefrom and removed by a wrongdoer, or by a tenant without the consent
of the owner of the fee, they become,
at the option of the owner of the soil,
personal property, and may either be
retaken by him or his agent without

process, by seizure and forcing them
from the wrongdoer, using no more
violence than is necessary for that purpose: State v. Elliot, 11 N. H. 540; or
may be recovered by the owner in an
action of replevin: Snyder v. Fraux,
2 Rlawle 423; Harlan v. Harlan, 15
Penn. St. 507; Christian v. Dripps, 28
Id. 278; Cresson v. Stout, 17 Johns.
116; Laflin v. Griffiths, 35 Barb. 58;
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CongregationalSoc. of Dubuque v. Flem-

ROEis, J., in Harlan v. Harlan, supra,

ing, 11 Iowa 533; Ogden v. Stodc, 34
Ill. 522 ; Sandsv. Pfefl.fer, 0 Cal. 258;
Richardson v. York, 14 Ale. 16.
The rule stated above is subject to the
qualification, stated in the principal case,
that the title to real property cannot be
tried in a transitory action. "The plaintiff out of possession cannot sue for
property severed from the freehold,
where the defendant is in possession of
the premises from which the property
was severed, holding adversely in good
faith under claim and color of title; in
other words, the personal action cannot
be made the means of litigating and determining the title to the real property
as between conflicting claimants :" Hallee. v. Mixer, 16 Cal. 574; Brown V.
Cadwell, 10 S. & 1R. 114 ; Powell v.
Smith, 2 Watts 126; Snyder v. Faux,
2 Rawle 423 ; Beaton v. lndlay, 12
Penn. St. 307 ; Anderson v. Bafpler, 34
IU. 436.
The qualification above stated has
been illustrated by a variety of cases, a
few of which may profitably be referred
to more particularly. In Page v. Fowler, 28 Cal. 605; s. 0. 37 Id. 100, it
was held that replevin for hay cut on
public lands could not be maintained by
a prior possessor against one in adverse
possession claiming a pre-emption right
when he cut the hay ; to the same effect
see Page v. Fowler, 39 Cal. 412 ; Stockwell v. Phelps, 34 N. Y. 363. The rule
has been carried so far that where the
plaintiff had recovered in ejectment land
with a mill situated thereon, and, after
judgment and before a writ of habere
facias possessionem had been issued, the
defendant while yet in actual possession
severed and removed from the mill the
bolting-cloth, meal-chest, mill-spindle,
&c., for the recovery of which the plaintiff brought replevin, it was held that
the recoveryin ejeetment was not eqnivalent to actual possession, and that replevin did not lie: Powell v. Smith, 2
Watts 126; referring to which decision,

said: "It is true there was a recovery
in ejeetment, but no habere facias bad
been issued, and, consequently, the possession of the defendant continued as
before to be adverse. Tie remedy,
therefore, was not replevin, but an action for mesne profits, or by writ of
estrepement."
A mere intruder or trespasser, however, is in no position to raise the question of title with the owner so as to
defeat the action: Halleck v. Mixer,
supra; Harlan v. Harlan, 15 Penn.
St. 507 ; Kimball r. Lohmas, 31 Cal.
154. There must be something more
than a mere assertion of title, in order
to warrant a judgment for the defendant,
and the court in such cases wilrlook into.
the case to see if there is in reality a
claim of title to try. "It is not the
actual possession, but it is the actual
adverse possession of a person who
claims title to it that is the criterion."
* * * "The mere assertion of a title
would be nothing. The court looks to the
substance, and where it appears that in
truth it is a trial of title, then it is'
properly ruled that replevin is not the
proper action, but that it must be tried
in another form. Beyond the cases do
not go, nor does public policy require
they should." RoGERs, J., in Harlan
v. Harlan, supra; Page v. Powler, 39
Cal. 412, 418. See, also, the remarks
of SANDEnsoN, J., in Kimball v. Lohmas,
supra.
From the cases cited, it clearly appears that upon authority the decision
of the court upon the first point in the
case is correct. The reasoning of the
court upon the second point in the casef
as to the effect of the Act of May 15th
1871, upon the right to maintain the
action, is also so clear and conclusive as
to render the citation of further authorities useless; and upon the whole
there can be no doubt as to the entire
correctness of the decision of the case.
SMAnsALL
D. EwELL.
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Supreme Court of Indiana.
PERCELL v. ENGLISH.
The rule that a landlord not under contract to repair is not responsible to. the
tenant for injuries caused by a neglect to repair, applies to a case where the landlord hires out apartmdents to separate tenants, and the stairway, the neglect to
repair, which caused the injury, was the common passage-way for the use of all the
tenants.
A., the owner of a building, leased to B. rooms in the upper story. The
approach to these rooms was by a stairway common to the use of all the tenants.
The railing of this stairway had 'been suffered to get out of repair. The stairway
became dangerous from ice and snow, and B., in attempting to descend slipped,
and in falling caught the railing which gave way, precipitating 1B.to the ground.
Held, that A. was not liable in damages.
A promise to repair- made by the landlord after the lease is entered into, is a
mere sndum pactum, and does not render the landlord liable for injuries caused by a
failure torepair..

FpuoR the Mlarion Circuit Court.
This was an action by a tenant against her landlord to recover
damages for injuries caused by the defective condition of the premises. Tb~e facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion which was
delivered by.
ELLIOTT, J.-The -case 'made by the appellant's complaint,

'shortly stated, is this: She was the' tenanut of the appellee, having
leased rooms in. an upper story of a building owned by him; 'the
approach to these rooms was by a stairway common to the use of
all the tenants of the building; the railing of this staiwayhad
been suffered to get, out of repair arid was rotten and loose; the
stairway became dangerous and unsafe from ice and snow
6'hich
covered the steps; the appellant, in attempting to descend, slipped,
and in falling caught the railing whi h gave way, and 'she'fell to
-the pavement and was seriously hurt. It will be observe'd that-the
,complaint does not allege that, the landlord had Contracted to
l that the duty rested
repair, but proceeds entirely on th hery
upon him independently of contract.

'.

The court, upon the close 'of the appellant's 'evidence, 'directed
the jury to return a verdict for the defendant.
The court may, there is no doubt, direct the jury to return a
verdict in favor of the defendant ih, a proper case: Thaslher v.- The
Allenville, 4 C., 0o., sind. 78-;' Weic v. The City of Mifadison,
Id. 241; Ra'gar v. IOitizens' Bank', 72 Id. 130 Dodge v.
Gaylord, 53 Id. 865; Pteasants v: 1ant 22 Wl.l 116.'',
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When the cause of action declared on is negligence the court
may direct a verdict for the defendant, in cases where the evidence
wholly fails to make out a prima facie case. It is true that the
question of negligence is generally one of mingled law and fact,
but there are cases where the question is purely one of law: Binford v. Johnsdn, 82 Ind. Where there is no dispute as to the
facts, and no controversy as to the inferences that can be legitimately drawn from them, the question is one of law, and the court
may rightfully take the case from the jury: 2 Thomp. on Neg.
1236, 1237; Thomp. Charging the Jury 23; Toomey v. London,
P
30. B. (N. S.) 146.
The right of the court to withdraw the case from the jury
unquestionably exists in cases where negligence is the issue as
-well as in other cases; but whatever may be the character of the
issue, the case cannot be taken from the jury if there are any facts
proved from which the jury would by fair and reasonable inference
be authorized to find for plaintiff. All reasonable inferences, not,
however, forced and violent ones, are to be indulged in favor of
the plaintiff on such a case, for the rule is substantially the same
as that which obtains in cases where there is a demurrer to the
evidence: .Hazzardv. Citizens' Bank, 72 Ind. 180; Steinmetz v.
Wingate, 42 Id. 574; Wilcuts v. BTorth Western, 4c., Co., 81 Id.
80; Firitz v. Clarc, 80 Id. 591. If the evidence given upon the
trial of this cause can by fair intendment, or reasonable inference
be deemed to make out the cause of action declared on, then the
appellant is entitled to a reversal. It is not sufficient even upon a
demurrer to the evidence, that the plaintiff make out some cause
of action; but it is incumbent upon him to make out the cause of
action set forth in his complaint. He cannot declare on one cause
of action and recover upon another. There is in this complaint
no allegation that the appellee had agreed to keep the demised
premises in repair, and even if a contract had been proved, it is
doubtful whether the appellant could have been allowed to succeed
on the theory that there was a contract. But waiving this point,
and going to the evidence, we are clear that no contract was
proved. The utmost that can be claimed is that the evidence
tends to show a voluntary promise, made after the contract for the
letting of the premises had been entered into. This evidence did
not establish, nor tend to establish, a contract on the part of the
landlord to repair; for it did no more than show a mei'e gratuitous
VOL. XXXI.-40
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promise creating no binding obligation. The rule upon this subject is thus stated in a recent work : "A promise to repair, made
after the lease is entered into, is a mere nudum pactum, and no
liability exists on his (the landlord's) part for a failure to make
such repairs :" Wood's Land. and Tenant, sect. 882; -Libbey v.
Tolford, 48 Me. 316; G-ill v. Tiddleton, 105 Mass. 477; s. o.
7 Am. Rep. 548; Doype v. Genin, 37 How. Pr. 5; s. c.
45 N. Y. 119.
The case is therefore to be treated as one in which there is
no contract, on the part of the landlord to repair.
Where.there is fio duty, there can be no actionable negligence:
Cooley on Torts 659; Add. on Torts, sect. 28; Whart. on Neg.,
sect. 3. In cases of the class to which the present belongs, three
of the essential things which the plaintiff is required to establish,
are the existence of a duty, that it is owing to him, and that it has
not been performed. The material part of the appellant's case could
not be made out without showing a duty owing to her from her
landlord to keep the demised premises in repair. The duty of the
landlord to repair does not arise out of the relation of landlord and
tenant; on the contrary, the relation devolves that duty upon the
tenant. It is only where the landlord contracts to maintain the
premises in, repair that he is burdened with that duty. The logical
conclusion from this principle, and a more firmly settled one there
is not in all the books, is:that a landlord not under contract to
repair, is not, as a general rule, rebponsible to the tenant for
injuries caused by a defective condition of the demised premises.
In,.a carefully written article in the American Law Review, the
authorities are reviewed, and the rule deduced that there is no
warranty, express or implied, as to the condition of the demised
premises, and that the tenant must determine for himself the
safety and fitness of the premises for use and occupancy: 6 Am.
Law Rev. 614; Taylor on Land. and Tenant, 6th ed., 381. This
is the rule adopted by our own cases: Estep v. Estep, 23 Ind.
114, vide authorities cited, page 116.
Ordinarily, therefore,
a tenant who leases property takes upon himself all risks, except,
perhaps, as against latent defects not discoverable by the use of
ordinary diligence, and cannot recover damages from his landlord
because of an omission to make the premises habitable or safe.
Whether a tenant would have a right to abandon the premises if
thel means of access to them had become unsafe and dangerous
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is not here the question. The question here is, whether the tenant
continuing in possession and making use of the premises, can
recover damages for personal injuries caused by the unsafe condition of the means of ingress and egress? There are cases, we
may remark in passing, holding that even -where the landlord
covenants to make repairs and fails to do so, the tenant must,
where the expense is not great, make them and charge them
against the landlord: Cook v. Soule, 56 N. Y. 420; Loker v.
-Damon, 17 Pick. 284; 111iller v. Mariner's Ohureh, 7 Me. 51;
Benkard v. Babcock, 2 Rob. 175. The duty of the tenant to
keep in safe condition for his own use the demised premises extends
to all the appurtenances connected therewith, and this includes
steps, stairways and other approaches. Whatever passes to the
tenant under the lease, is for the term designated, under his control
and in his possession: Pomfret v. Bicroft, 1 Saund., 5th ed., 321;
Wood on Land. and Tenant, sect. 213; Auth. n. 371. If he neglects to make repairs, and suffers the premises to become unsafe, it
is clear that in ordinary cases, at least, no action will lie against
the landlord for injuries suffered by the tenant, and caused by the
unsafe condition of the premises arising from the neglect to repair.
It is obvious, from this statement of fundamental principles, that
in cases of an ordinary tenancy, the tenant cannot maintain an
action against the landlord for injuries caused by the neglect to
repair the demised premises, unless the landlord has expressfy
covenanted to repair.
If the appellant can maintain this action it must be because her
case possesses some elements which carry it out of the general rule.
The only element in this case which can with any plausibility be
said to distinguish it from ordinary cases of tenancy, is that the
landlord hired out apartments to separate tenants, and that their
common stairway was the common passage for the use of all. It is
difficult to perceive how this fact can exert a controlling influence
upon the question of the landlord's liability, for, whether the
premises are demised to one or to many tenants the principle upon
which rests the landlord's immunity from the burden of repairing
is not changed, nor does it change the effect of the contract by
which the premises are demised. As said by a writer, already
referred to: " For a tenant is at once a bailee and a purchaser; he
is a bailee because of his ownership being determinable and not
absolute; yet being exclusive while it lasts, he is, by the mere fact

6

P.ERCELL v. MEINGLISH.

of the demise, and in the absence of special undertakings to that
effect, charged with a trust to restore the property in substantially the
same condition as when he took it :" 6 Am. Law Rev. 614. It
would seem clear, On principle, that the landlord's duty is the same
whether he', demises to one or to many tenants, so far as concerns
to tenant for personal injuries caused by a failure to
repair. -InRum2
preh] v. 'Tait, 22 Upper Canada C. P. 580, the
plaintiff had hired apartments of the defendant in a building
occupied in part by other tenants, and sustained injuries by steppIng through a hole in the floor of a common passage-way leading
to the apartments, and it was held that an action could not, be
maintained against the landlord, and a nonsuit was directed. In
the course ofthe opinion delivered in that case, HAGARTY, 0. J.,
said: "It would be a singular state of the law if a landlord would
not be answerable if lie demised the stairway with the upper story,
and would be answerab!.e if he only gave a right to use the part
of the house actually'-demised.", In Gott v. andy, 2 B. & B.

845,' Lord OAMPBELL, said: "Now let us see what are the facts
alleged.' They are these: the defendant was the landlord of the
premises which were let to the plaintiffs from year to year; during
the tenancy the premises were in a dangerous state for want 9f
substantial repairs; the defendant had notice from the plaintiff,
n'' ai reuesto
oepair them and did not do so. There
is no
Allegion of 'any contract to do substantial repairs. It lies therefore on the counsel of the plaintiffs, who are the actors, to establish
on, authority or on principle, that this obligation results from the
relation of landlord and tenant. Mr. Russell can produce no
authority in his favor, not even a dictum. And I have heard of
no legal principle froin which it would follow that the landlord was
bound to repair the premises-,
In Cartairsv. ,TaYjlor, L. R., 6 Ex. 216, the doctrine was carried
to,the extent of holdins that there is no liability on the part of the
landlord who himself occupied a part of the premises, unless it is
shown that he was negligent with respect to the particular act,
which caused the injury. The English cases 'agree in holding that
for injuries for a failure to repair, no action will lie by the tenant
against the landlord: 1 Add. on Torts 240 ; Smith, on land. and
Tenant 206; 1?obbins- v. Jones, 15 0. B. N. S. 221 ; -Payne v.
Rogers, 2,H.,, B1. 350.
Turning to the American authorities, we find in one of our
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books this statement of the rule, whether too broad or not 1we need
not stop to inquire: "The liability of the landlord exists only in
favor of persons who stand strictly upon their rights as strangers :"
Sherman and Redf. on Neg., sect. 503. Another author says:
"1An owner being out of possession, and not bound to repair, is
not liable in this action (i. e., for nuisance), for injuries received
in consequence of his neglect to repair :" Whart. on Keg., sect.
817. In still another work, it is said, in speaking of a landlord's
liability : "iNor in the absence of a covenant to repair is he Iliable
for injury resulting from the faulty construction oi condition lof the
premises, the control over which is in the hands of a tenant, either
to a tenant or third persons :" Wood on Land. and Tenant, sect.
384; 1 Thomp. on Neg. 823. In 14 How. Pr. 163, the action
Was for injuries received from falling down a stairvay forming a
common passage-way, by one tenant occupying part of premises,
also occupied by other tenants of the same landlord, and it was
held that no action could be maintained. The same general principle is declared'in the cases of Doolittle v. Howard, 3 Duer 464;
v. Hirsh, 46
Bobbins v. 3Mount, 33 How. Pr. 24. In gaiser
a part of
occupied
who
an
owner
How. Pr. 161, it was held that
the house was not liable for an injury to a visitor to one of his
tenants, unless it was shown that his (the landlord's) nelighence
was the cause of the injury, and that the fact that he occupied a
part of the premises created no presumption against him; a lile
'doctrine is declared in ilroore v. 'oedel, 34 N. Y. 527. The
Supreme Court of California, held in the case of Loupe v. Wood,
51 Cal. 586, that there was no liability on the part of the landlord
arising from the defective condition of the walls of the cellar.
We have examined the cases cited by the appellant, and do not
find any of them in point. The cases in the Georgia Reports are
not in point, because they are founded upon an express statute
making it the duty of the landlord to repair. The cases of Godley
v. Hagerty, 2 Penn. St. 387, and H7ouse v. .iletcayf, 27 Id. 600,
were actions by a stranger, and are therefore not in point.'
Fisher v. Thirkell,. 21 Mich. 1; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 422, is
against rather than in favor of the appellant. In that case tIhe
landlord was held not to be liable to one who suffered an injury by
falling through a scuttle in a sidewalk adjoining premises in the
possession of a tenant. The other case cited, Shindelb ck v. iTHoon,
-32Ohio St. 264; s. c.30 Am.'Rep. 584, is also'against the'doc-
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trine maintained by counsel, In that case the injurywas occasioned
by the accumulation of ice upon steps leading into a storeroom
owned by the defendant, but occupied by a tenant; and the holding was that the landlord was not liable for injuries sustained by a
stranger. In closing the opinion it was said: 1"And again it was
the icel that occasioned the accident. It is not averred that it
wvas the !duty of the landlord to remove this ice, nor does it appear
that he was called upon to do it. If this ice was a nuisance to the
passing public, endangering their lives and limbs, it was a nuisance
arising during 'the continuance: of the lease. It was a thing temporary in its nature, a defective condition of things such as the
tenant was called upon to remedy, and not the landlord, as between
landlord and tenant."'
- We have, in our investigation, found one case which lends support to the general doctrine for which appellant's counsel contend.
The case to which we refer is that of Looney v. 1lcLean, 129 Mass.
33; s. c. 37 Am. Rep. 295. In that case the wife of the tenant of a
part of a tenement-house occupied by several families, was injured
by the giving way of one of the steps of the stairway leading to
the roof of a shed used in common by the tenants for the purpose
of drying clothes; and it was held that an action would lie
against the landlord.
The question is not discussed., and only cases from Massachusetts
are cited, and they do not decide the point. On the contrary, such
of them as apply to the relation of landlord and tenant, recognise
the rule that the landlord is not liable to the tenant for a failure to
repair.! Two of them do not touch upon the subject of a landlord's
liability. One of the two is upon the question of the 'liability
of a railroad: company which constructs a passage-way across a
public street, and the other is upon the same general question.
But conceding the soundness of the ruling in that case it does not
apply to the case at bar, for here the, cause of the injury was not
the defective construction of the stairway, or its unsafe condition
at the time the premises were leased. The stairway here is directly
connected with thepart of the premises leased to the appellant; 'in
the Massachusetts case it was otherwis;. 'Here the thing which
made the' stairway'unsafe was the temporary covering of snow and
ice. While in the Massachusetts case the unsafe condition was
pe rManeut, and had long existed. It is not necessary for us in the
present case, to lay down any general rule upbn the subject of' a
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landlord's liability to a tenant occupying apartments in a tenement-house occupied by other tenants. It is sufficient for us to
ascertain and state a rule governing cases such as that made by
the evidence before us. We are satisfied the authorities warrant
us in adjudging that where a stairway connected with the apartments hired in a tenement-house, occupied by several tenants, is
rendered unsafe by temporary causes, such as the accumulation of
snow and ice, the landlord is not liable to the tenant who uses
such a stairway, with a full knowledge of its dangerous condition,
unless there is a contract on the part of the landlord to keep the
premises in repair and fit for safe use. Any other rule would
entail upon landlords a grievous and unjust burden-cast
upon them a duty which long-settled rules has imposed upon
the tenants and which results in imperilling the interests of an
owner out of possession and relieving those in possession of his
property from that care which the law imposes upon bailees and
others occupying analogous positions. If any other rule is adopted
then the owner is charged with the duty of watching steps leading
to every part of the premises, and of keeping them free from all
temporary obstructions. For let it once be granted that the landlord is liable for obstructions or defects not permanent and not
growing out of the character of the structure, it will be impossible to draw any line, and he must be held accountable for all
obstructions and defects, no matter how transient their character.
Whether a landlord hiring apartments to many tenants is liable
for latent defects or for faults in the construction, or for permanent
defects in the common passage-ways, we do not decide. The evidence before us shows that the ice and snow made the stairway
unsafe and caused the accident. But for the ice and snow which
the tenant could have removed with very little labor, or at a trifling
expense, the appellant could have used the stairway in perfect
safety. We are satisfied that the court below was right in holding
that the cause of the accident was the accumulation of the ice and
snow upon the stairway, and that for an injury r~sulting from suh
a cause, a landlord, who had made no covenant to repaii', is not
liable.
Judgment
affirmed.
Referring to the duty of a landlord in

lord and tenant gives rise to questions

the absence of a stipulation to repair,
ELE, J., says, that the relation of land-

more frequently than any other relation ;
so we should expect to find an example
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_affirming the landlord's duty fit existed,
,but there is none: Gott v. Gandy, 23
L. J., Q. B. 1.
The, common law of England casts
the burden on the tenant, in ordinary
cases, to repair: Fergusonv.2 Esp. 5903 Taylor, Landlord & Tenant,
sect. 327 (7th ed.).
American cases adopt this rule: .Taffe
v. Harteau, 56 N. YI. 398; Biddle v.
Reed, 33 Ind. 529 ; Corey v. Mann,
6 Deer 679; Casad v.
tqhes, 27 lnd.
141; Smith Y. Kinkaid, 1 Brad. 620;
Vai v. Weld, 17 Mo. 232; Krueqer v.
Farant,13 N.
. Rep. 158.
. The. doctrine of caveat emptor applies
to a tenant taking, possession of the
premises., He has opportunity for inspection, and he cannot claim immunity
from or reimbursement for defects in the
premises at the time of the demise : Hart
v, Windsor, 12 Al. & W. 68 ; Gottv. Gandy, supra, per Lord Q.xP.nLn
; Cleves
v. Willoughby, 7 Hill 83; Dutton v.
Gerrish, 9 Oush. 89 ; Welles v. Castles,
3Gray 323; Keats v. Cadogan, 10 C.
-Bt591.
.But if there is a latent defect within
the landlor4l's knowledge, and he rents
the premises, he is liable for damages
that may accrue to his tenants, as where
the owner of a house knowing it to be
infected with contagious diseases, leases
it for the purposes of habitation without
disclosing the fact to one who is ignorant
of its condition : Minor v. Sharon, 112
Mass. 477; s. c. 17 Am. Rep. 122. To
the, same effect Cesar Y. Karutz, 60 N.
I. 229 ; s. a. 19 Am. Rep. 164.
However, in, case of a pasture let by
the owner over which had accidentally
been spread, without his knowledge, a
poisonous substance which kills the cattle
feeding in the pasture, the tenant is not
released from his liability to pay the
rent or abandon the pasturage: Sutton
y. Temple, 12M.& W. 52.
The doctrine laid. down in the principal
ease that the stairway was appurtenant
to the premises of the tenant, and being
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under her control and in her, possession
she was liable for repairs, does not accord
with principles enunciated in some decisionsL in the Massachusetts Supreme
Court:
In a case in that Lcourt MEIun:e, J.,
says, "It is undoubtedly a well-settled
principle of common law that the
occupier and not the landlord is bound,
as between himself and the public, so
far to keep buildings, and other, structures abutting upon common highways,
in repair, that they may be safe for
the use of travellers thereon, and that
such occupier is prima fade liabl6 to
third persons for damages arising from
any defect; but the defendants cannot
avail themselves of that principle in
defence of this action. Although all
the separate parts of their building, consisting of cellars, stalls and disconnected
chambers, were leased either at will or
for a term of years to many different
tenants, yet the defendants had a general
supervision over thewhole and had-the
entire control of the outside doors and
outside passage-ways so far as was necessary to enable them to make repairs;
the obligation to do which rested exclusively on them. They also kept the
key of the market-room, and opened
and closed the doors of it at certain fixed
hours, conforming, however, in respect
to the time of doing it, to the wishes of
the tenants. Under these circumstances
there was no such occupancy by the
tenants as would cast upon them the
obligation of keeping the building in
repair, or to make them responsible to
third persons for damages resulting from
its defects; but the liability in that
particular, continued to rest on the
owner:" .Kirby v. Boylston, 4-c., Association, 14 Gray 250.
"There is no implied warranty in the
letting of a house that it is safe and fit
for habitation. A lease does not imply
any particular state of the property let,
or that it shall continue fit for the purposes for which it is let; unless other-
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wise stipulated the tenant takes the
premises as they are, and must pay the
rent for the term. But this rule applies
only to premises which, by the terms of
the lease, have passed out of the control
of tle landlord into the exclusive possession of the tenant. Where a portion
of a building is let, and the tenant has
rights of passage-way over staircases
and entries in common with the landlord
and the other tenants, there is no such
leasing as will exonerate the landlord
from all responsibility for the safe condition of that portion of which he still
retains control, and which he is bound to
keep in repair; as to such portion, he
still retains the responsibilities of a
general owner to all persons, including
the tenants of his building. The case
shows that the plaintiff had a simple
right of access to the shed over this
staircase, as incident to her occupation
of the premises leased to her. The duty
of the defendant, having still the possession and control of the same was to
protect her from injury in that right by
the use of reasonable care on his part.
The stairway was apparently intended
to fnrnish a passage-way for her use,
and the defendant is responsible for injuries received by one entering upon
the same by his invitation or procurement, express or implied:" Looney v.
MeLean, f29 Mass. 33.
The defendants owned a building,
consisting of three shops, standing forty
feet back from the line of Essex street in
Lawrence, and having a wooden platform extending from it to the sidewalk
of Essex street. Oral leases of these
shops were made to each tenant. The
platform had no fences or lines of any
kind separating the parts thereof in front
of the several shops from each other,
but was entirely open, so that persons
passed over it in any direction in going
to either of the shops. The plaintiff,
without negligence, was injured by a
defect in the platform. The court said,
"If the lease to each tenant was of the
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shop occupied by him, and the landlord
bad constructed a plattbrm for the common use and benefit of all the shops
and of the 'public, there would be no
presumption, in the absence of any
agreement to that effect, that the tenants
were to keep the platform in repair.
Neither tenant acquired any exclusive
right to use or control the part of the
platform in front of his shop, and there
was no such leasing of the platform as
would exonerate the landlord from' responsibility for defects in it."
The following instruction given in the
court below was approved, to wit:
" The presumption of law would be that
such a platform, in the absence of any
agreement, between the landlord and
tenants of such shops as to repairs of it
was to be repaired by the landlord.
Such a platform would be like the single
staircase provided by the landlord of a
building consisting of several stories,
divided into numerous tenements, occupied by different tenants, all of whom
had 'right of ingress and egress into and
from the building and their respective
tenements by means of the common
staircase, and all of whom might be
presumed to be obliged to repair' their
respective tenements, and none of whom
could be presumed to be obliged to repair
the staircase, common to the use of every
one of them and of their tenements :"
Readma v. Conway, 126 Mass. 374. '''
In Humphrey v. Whit, 22 Upper
Canada 587, HAOARTY, C. J., said:
"If the plaintiff had become tenant to
the defendant of the whole house, in the
absence of express covenant or agreement, it is clear she would have no
cause of action against him for noirepair. Her counsel, admitting this
principle, seeks to put her claim on a
better footing by saying, that with the
part of the house demised, she had also
granted to her a right 'of way over the
passages for ingress 'and egress. She
became tenant of the room while the
hole was open in the passage. So long
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as the landlord did nothing in the way
of commission to derogate (as it were)
from his own grant, she hasI, think,, no
remedy. We may concede-that le could
not place any obstruction on the' passage
to hinder, her use .of it; -but he, was not,
I consider, boundto repair and uphold
it. It just amounts to this: A man
owns a house in an almost ruinous state;
anotheor rents it from him as it stands ;
the latter has no remedy and must pay
his rent. So if a man rent the upper
story of a house with the staircae-the
only means of approach-in a ruinous
and unsafe state, I see no implied obligation on the landlord to uphold it or to
answer in damages for an injury resulting from its insecure state."
In SullivabVs'. 3otersi 14, Ir., 0. L.
460, itis said: "A mere license given by
the owner to enter and use premises, for,
which the licensee has full opportunity,
which contain no concealed cause of mischief, apd in yhieh any existing pource of
danger is apparent, throws no obligation
upon the owner to guard the licensee
'against danger.'
....'
j The owners of -a pier, are liable, for
injuri" , pustained by an indiyid 9 al, b
reason of its defective construction and
dangerous

condition,

notwithStanding

tlih prenise rc' at lietime in'the 'pos"sdssion of a'tenant, who has covenanted.
.to. keep the pier, in repair, if. the, defects
existed when th9 owners leased the
property to him Moody v. Mayor, A-c.,
:I
4ilfBarb. 282.
'' The occupant of apartments in' a tenement is not bound either to see to the
erection, of a proper, 0rnk or privy upon
the premises, or to cause them to be
emptied -o prevent an overflow. Thia
duty devolves upon the landlord: 'Fash
v Kavanagh, 24 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 347.
The lessor ri,bon q to make such
repairs as are necessary to make the
premises secure. and'safe for the: purposes
for which they are rented ; and if their
insecuritkr is known to him, it is negli,gence pot to do,
Jhson c-Dixon,
io.
1 Daly 178.

A landlord was told that an outbuilding was in an unsafe condition, and lie
undertook, gratuitously, at the request of
his tenant, to make it safe; he not only
assumed to do the work, but he notified
the tenant when, it was done, invited
him to use such building, assuring im it
was perfectly safe. It proved unsafe,
and the tenant's wife was injured thereby.
The landlord was held liable. Gill v.
.iiddleton, 105 Mass. 477.
A landlord's liability to the tenant
depends on the exclusiveness of his possession, and active control: Taylor,
Landlord and Tenant, sect. 175 ; Tenant
v. Goldwin, Lord Raymond 1089 ; Piest
Y. Nichols, 116 Mass. 401.
'
The servants of the occupants of an
upper tenement accidentally left open a
faucet, thereby causing the water to overflow and flood the tenement below. It
was held that the occupants of the upper
tenement were liable for damages thereby
done: Simonton r. Lacing, 68 Me. 164.
A stipulation "to repair" binds the
lessee to rebuild in' case of loss of fire
during the term: .ZVave v. Berry, 22
Ala. 382.
For a covenant to repair is a covenant
to rebuild: Fowler v. Payne, 49 Miss.

-32.
Where premises are leased for a term
of years, and the lessor does not covenant to rebuild the destruction by fire of
the building rented will not exempt the
lessee from the further payment of rent.
lie must pay for the whole of the term:
Gibson v. Perry, 29 Mo. 245.
- Prima faecie a tenant is liable to
answer for any neglect in the repair of
fences orp'arty walls, or for any improper' use of the premises for the fixtures thereon, or for a nuisance kept on
the premises, or for an obstruction ,of the
highway adjacent: Taylor, sect. 178:
Chicago v. Brenna, 65 III. 160 ; Rider
v. Smith, 3 T. U. 766 ; Regina v. W~atts,
I Salk. 357..
COiARcrs Tro'rsor.
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Supreme Court of 0ichigan.
WOOD v. BARKER.
In a suit by a physician to recover compensation for his services, where the only
testimony as to the value of the services and the propriety of the treatment is the
opinion of other physicians, it is error to instruct the jury that they may disregard
this opinion and use their own judgment on the question of value.
While the value of a physician's services, at a given time and place, may be
known to other persons than physicians, there is no legal presumption and no
reasonable probability that all jurymen have this knowledge, and upon a question
of medical skill, it is error to allow the jury to draw adverse conclusions which
could only be based upon their unprofessional notions as to how the injuries should
have been treated.
ERROR to

Chippewa.

Charles S. Cushman and TV. S.

tUmpphrey, for plaintiff.

Geo. TV. Brown, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-Plaintiff, who is a surgeon, sued defendant on
his promise to pay for professional services rendered to one Murray,
who had been injured by a blast so that both legs were badly
crushed below the knee. Plaintiff was called in as counsel to aid
the attending surgeon, Dr. Harding, shortly after the accident, at
Sault Ste. Marie. The left leg was amputated, and they were both
of opinion that amputation of the other was expedient, by reason
of the extensive comminuted fracture of the bones and laceration
involving injury to an artery, to prevent extreme danger of death.
The opposition of Murray to this prevented the amputation and the
limb was ultimately saved, but not entirely restored to its original
condition. Some time after the plaintiff had ceased his yisits and
while the case was in the hands of Dr. Harding, aided by a nurse,
Dr. Jessop of Mackinaw came over and was employed" to treat the
patient in connection with Dr. Harding. The only medical testimony in the case was given by plaintiff and Dr. Harding. Dr.
Jessop was not sworn. The employment by defendant seems to
have been shown, and the questions on which the controversy
appears to have turned were the value of the services and the propriety of the treatment.
It is to be observed that there is no conflict of testimony whatever in regard to the fact of the work and attendance of plaintiff,
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and no testimony which did not leave a considerable sum due him
if ithose services were properly rendered. The court in charging
the jury told them in substance that they -were at' liberty, if not
satisfied with the testiinony of the experts, to use their own judgment
-on the question of value. They were also instructed that if plaintiff's course was unskilful, they might reduce the fees accordingly,
as, in their judgment should be deemed proper. They gave plaintiff nothing. - There can be no presumption of law concerning the
value of a surgeon's services and there is no presumption that a
*jury can ascertain it :without testimony of some kind, from persons
knowing something about such value. As already suggested there
,was positive 1testimony of value not discredited, and, in the case
of Dr. Harding, given by a disinterested witness called for important purposes'by the defendafit himself.. We can see no ,sufficient
reason for the suggestion that all of this testimony might be
disregarded, and there is no rule which would allow the jury
tolentirely ignore the testimony, and at the same time to, form an
independentl conclusion' without- testimony upon a matter which
-,required proof beyond Itheir conjecture or their opinion. We do
not say that the value of a physician's services at a given time and
place may not-be known to other persons than physicians, if they
have been in a position to learn the customary or proper rates.
But there is no legal presumption aid no reasonable probability
that all jurymen have this knowledge. And there can be no
.s.afty to any one if juries are to use their own ° unguided vie'ws on
such ,matters..
Neither Was there any evidence iWbich would justify the
jury in
'reducing the otherwise appropriate compensation on the ground
that plaintiffs 'treatment was improper. There was no such evidence. Thefact, that the injured limbs were slow in healing and
'imperfectly healed at last does not necessarily show that the treat'ment as improper. The injuries as described were of a very
Aggravated,,nature, and beyond any ordinary fracture, the limbs
being bruised and badly lacerated, the bones crushed and an artery
torn.' tBoth medical witnesses were of opinion that there was danger 'in leavinf the right leg on. There is nothing to show that the
,epurse taken, under 'plaintiff 's' oversightlwas not the proper one,
and nothing to show that when he left thecase in the hands of the
regular surgeon and'nurse, anything necessary had been omitted or
. n'thing' dne out of the way. On: the contrary, not only the
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plaintiff but Dr. Harding gave positive testimony the other way.
There is nothing to show that the plaintiff did not possess and use
competent skill. The fact that some time later Dr. Jessop made
some change in the management of the remaining limb had no tendency to show that the previous treatment was not proper at the
time, and no one testifies that it was not. Dr. Harding's testimony indicates entire harmony of views, and Dr. Jessop is not produced to contradict him. No other medical testimony is offered to
show any failure of skill or any mistake in the treatment.
Where all the testimony in the case is in favor of the treatment
pursued, and the question is one of 'medical skill., which can only
be tested by those familiar with such matters, it was error to let
the jury draw adverse conclusions, which could only be based on
their unprofessional notions of how such injuries should be treated.
The fact that Murray survived is not evidence that his case was not
desperate in appearance or in fact, and the fact that his limb is not
restored to perfect soundness is no proof that he has been maltreated.
The jury could not rightly be allowed to find malpractice without
testimony from persons who were qualified to give opinions onL the
methods of treatment.
,, ,
The judgment must be reversed with costs and a new trial
granted...
.
.. ..
(The other justices concurred.)
I I
Sometimes on the ground of special
skill in the witness, and sometimes upon
the ground of the impossibility of describing in adequate language matters
which have been previously presented to
his personal observation, opinions are
admitted in evidence in courts of justice.
To pr6ve value, opinion evidence is
resorted to as a general rule from necessity, not only where the subject of such
testimony is a matter of common knowledge, but also where it is of a kind
requiring special skill to explain or
appraise it. There are many things
whose value any one may testify to, it
being a matter of common knowledge,
and not one requiring special and peculiar study,, observatio2 or skill. Thus,
every one may be presumed to have a
somewhat correct idea of the value of
property which is in almost universal

use. Thus the question is as to'tie
value of a cow.
lere' the opinion of
an ordinary witness would be sufficient,
and -would,be admissible. Again, the
question is as to the value of a steam
engine, or a diamond. Ilere the opinion
of an ordinary witness would neither be
sufficient nor' admissible: Oldo, 6,e.,
Railroad Co. v. Irin, 27 Ill,179
(1862). So it has been held that an
ordinary article of clothing may have its
value proved by wearer of sicl garments who, has made, inquiries as to
their price for the purpose of purchace:
Printz v. People, 42 Mich. 144 (1879).
In a :Mississippi case, the question was
as to the value of a gun, and it wa held
that the opinion of an ordinary witness
was competent: Cooper v. Stqte, 53
Miss. 398 (1876). "In the nature of
things," said the court, "the value
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of this sort of property in such common
usc can be estimafed by almost every
man in the community. It is not like
painting, or precious stones, of which
experts alone can form atn intelligent
judgment, but is rather like that class
of merchandise and commodities of the
value of wvhich most persons live knowledge.", And in Indiana, it has been
ruled that "it does not require a knowledge of any particular science, art or
skill to enable one to testify as to the
value of board and lodging:" Chamness
v. Clhanness, 53 Ind. 301 (1876).
"It is not necessary, in order to qualify
one to give an opinion as to values, that
his information should be of such a
direct character as would make it competent in itself as primary evidence. It
is the experience which he acquires in
the ordinary conduct of affairs, and
from means of information such as are
usually relied on by men engaged in
business for the conduct of that business,
that qualifies him to testify :" WELLS,
J., in WMitney v. Thacher, 117 Mass.
526 (1875).
Therefore, though as a
general thing, a witness, not an expert,
cannot be said to be qualified to express
an opinion as to the value of a thing,
unless lie has seen it: Westlake Y. St.
Lawrence Mutual Ins. Co., 14 Barb.
206 (1852) ; Todd v. Warner, 48 How.
Pr. 234 (1874); or has some special
knowledge of its value: Sanford v.
Sheph rd, 14 Kans. 228 (1875); Elfel
v. Smith, 1 iinn. 126 (1854); Whitmore v. Bowrnan, 4 G. Greene 148 (1853);
Selua. fc., Railroad Co. v. Keith, 57
Ga. 178 (1874) ; Haight v. .imbark,
51 Iowa 13 (1879) ; Clussman v. Merkel,
3 Bosw. 402 (1858)'; still there is no
rule of law, and there can be none,
defining how much a witness shall know
of property before he can be permitted
to give an opinion of its value.
He
must have some acquaintance with it,
sufficient to enable him to form some
estimate of its value, and then it is'for I
the jury to determine how much weight

to attach to such estimate: Bedl[ v.
Long Island Railroad Co., 44 N. Y. 367
(1871). A stricter rule is adopted in
Rhode Island, for there a witness is
required to show the possession of some
peculiar skill and knowledge on the subject, before lie will be permitted to give
an opinion as to the value of land or
other property: Bul'ar v. N'ew York,
6-c., Railroad Co., 4 R. I. 221 (1856);
.Forbes v. Joward, Id. 364 (1856).
Nevertheless, in other states, some special information (unless the matter is
one of common and universal knowledge) must be shown to be possessed by
the witness whose opinion is asked. An
adjudged case or two will illustrate
this. In Schmidt v. flerfurth, 5 Robt.
145 (1867), the witnesses whose opinions as to value were asked, were held
not sufficiently qualified to testify. There
the question was upon the value of a
Prussian thaler in United States currency. Two witnesses were called. One
had bought bills of exchange in that
money in Europe, he could not tell precisely its value in American currency,
as he depended on the value of gold
which he only knew from reading American newspapers abroad. The other
was a soldier in the United States army,
and did not show any special knowledge
of the -matter. Their opinions were
rejected. In another case, the question
was as to the value of a mill and
privilege. A. testified that he was something of a judge of the real estate in the
vicinity, but had no special knowledge
of the value of mills or mill privileges
on the stream; he had never bought,
sold, owned or operated a mill. His
opinion -was inadmissible: Clark v.,
Rockland Water Power Co., 52 Me. 77
(1860). " The witness," said the court,
"distinctively negatives the idea that lie
was possessed of peculiar knowledge or
skill in relation to the matter upon
which his opinion was desired. It cannot be necessary to cite authorities to
show that ihe opinions of a witness thus
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situated are not admissible in evidence
as an expert." Tie qualification of a
witness to express an opinion as to
value is a matter to be decided by the
trial court: Shattuck v. Stoneham Branch
Railroad Co., 6 Allen 117 (1863).
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Cush. 279; Wyman v. Lexington, 4-c.,
Railroad Co., 13 Mete. 327 (1847)
Crouse v. Holman, 19 Ind. 38 (1862)
Sexton v. North Bridgewater, 116 MNaos.
200 (1874) ; Hawkins v. City of th
River, 119 Id. 94 (1875) ; Dwight v.
County Commissioners, 11 Cnsh. 203
1. "vLUE or RE.tL PnorErTy. The (1853) ; Shattuck v. Stoneham Branch
market value of land is not a question Railroad Co., 6 Allen 116 (1863)
of science and skill upon which only an
Whitman v. Boston, -c., Railroad C(o. 7
expert can give an opinion. Persons Allen 316 (1863) ; Fowler v. County
living in the neighborhood may be pro- Commissioners, 6 Id. 96 (1863) ; Russell
suned to have a sufficient knowledge of v. Uorn Pond Branch Railroad Co., 4
the market value of property from the Gray 607 (1855) ;- Dickenson v. Inhabilocation and character of the land in tants of Fitchburg, 13 Id. 546 (1859);
questin: Pennsylvania, 6c., Railroad Ilanlenbeckl v. Cronlbright, 23 X. J. Eq.
Co. v. Bunnell, 81 Penn. St. 426 (1876).
408 (1873) ; Somerville, -c., Railroad
The-efore, except in one state, it is held Co. v. Doughty, 22 N. J. L. 495 (1850).
that the value of real property may he
In a Pennsylvania case (Kellogg v.
proved by the opinions of witnesses on Ki-rauser, 14 S. & R. 142 (1826) ), the
the subject: Brown v. Corey, 43 Penn. question was the 'value of mortgaged
St. 495 (1862) ; Cleveland, 4-c., Rail- property, and the opinion of a witness
road Co. v. Ball, 5 Ohio St. 568 was received. As to the admissibility
(1856) ; Atlantic, 6-c., Railroad Co. v, of this evidence, it was said in the SuCanobdll, 4 Id. 583 (1858) ; Dalzell preme Court: "1The principal reason
v. City of Davenport, 12 Iowa 440 asssigncd by the plaintiff against this
(1861) ; Evansville, 6c., Railroad Co. evidence wa., that an opinion of the
v. Cochran, 10 Ind. 560 (1858) ; Fergu- value of land is not evidence, because it
son v. Stajord. 33 Id. 162 (1870);
is not a fact. It is certain that such
Sater v. Burlington, 5-c., Railroad Co., - opinions are every day received as evi1 Iowa 386 (1855) ; Henry v. Dubuque, deuce, although it is true that an opinion
6'c., Railroad Co., 2 Id. 289 (1855) ; is not strictly a fact; and it is difficult
Dalzell v. City of Davenport, 12 Id. 437 to conceive how the value of land can
(1861); Holton v. Connuesioners of
be proved without them. The witness
Lake Co., 55 Ind. 194 (1876) ; Tate v. may, indeed, prove the prices at which
Missouri, 6-c., Railroad Co., 64 MIo. 149 other lands in the neighborhood were
(1876) ; Wa'rra v. Wheeler, 21 Me. sold, but that would not ascertain the
484 (1842) ; Carpenter v. Robinson, 1 value of the land in question without a
Holmes 73 (1871); Brown v. Provi- comparison between it and the land
dence, &c., Railroad Co., 5 Gray 35 which was sold as to quality; and
(1855) ; French v. Snyder, 30 Ill. 344 quality is very much a matter of opinion.
(1863) ; Laswell v. Robbins, 39 Id. 210 It is a kind of evidence so commonly
(1866) ; Cooper v. Randall, 59 Id. admitted without dispute or defection
317 (1871) ; Lafayette, 6-c., Railroad that I have no doubt of its legality."
Co. v, Winslow, 66 Id. 219 (1872) ;
In an Illinois case, it was said: "All
Green v. City of Clicago, 97 Id. 374 know that the value of real estate in
(1881) ; Franlfort, ,&'c., Railroad Co. this country is matter of estimate or conv. Windsor, 51 Ind. 238 (1875) ; Shaw elusion of the mind, arrived at by comv. City of 'harlestown, 2 Gray 107 parison with sales of like property,
(1854) ;,Walker v. City of Boston, 8 made under circumstances calculated to
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DUCTS. :Farmers are experts as to the
produce competition among, purchasers,
and develop the full value, by consider- value of farming land and its products:
ing its adaptation to use, present and Robertson v. Kinapp, 35 N. Y. 91 (1866).
prospective; its advantages and disad- Thins, in one case, where the defendant,
the owner of a brick kiln, was sued by
vantages, and upon which those equally
well qualified to judge will largely dis- a gardener for injuries to his garden
agree, To describe to a jury a piece from smoke, the opinion of another
of ground, however minutely, with its gardener concerning the depreciation of
supposed adaptations to use, advantages his garden and the things growing therein from the nuisance, was admitted:
and disadvantages, and demand of them,
upon this information alone, a verdict as
Vandine v. Bupee, 13 Mete. 288
to its ,value would be merely farcical;
(1847); Inhabitants v. Chase, 5 Gray
and this indeed is all that can be done
421 (1855). In another case, the plainto enable them to arrive at a conclusion
tiff claimed damages for the construction
as to its value, unless the witnesses are, of a railroad through his farm, and a
allowed to state their judgment or opin- farmer was allowed to give his opinion
ion, together with the facts upon which, as to the increased expense to the owner
in carrying on the farm, arising from
such, opinion is founded :" Illinois, 4-c.,
the road running through it: Tucker v.
R. R. Co. v. Von Horn, 18 Ill. 257(1857).
" It, is well settled in this ComnonMlassachusetts, &c., Railroad Co., 118
Mass. 546 (1875). In another, A. sued
wealth," says Gn.-k, J., in a Massachusetts case (Swan v. Counti/ of Mid- B. for damages caused by B.'s cattle
dlesex, 101 Mass. 173 (1869) ), "that
entering his land and destroying his,
when the value of real estate is in congrass, and the opinion of a farner as to
the value of the grass destroyed, was
troversy, opinions of persons acquainted
admitted: Towasend v. Brundage, 6
with its value are admissible in evidence.
Thomp. & C. 527 ; 4 Hun 264 (1875).
These opinions are admitted, not as
being the opinions of experts, strictly In another, A. sued B. for permitting
his cattle to destroy his corn, and a
so called, for they are not founded on
farmer was allowed to express an opinstudy, or training, or professional expeion as to how many bushels of corn
rience,, but rather from necessity, upon
there would have been on the land but
the ground that they depend upon knowledge which any one may acquire, but for the trespass of. the animal: Siid es
v. Goeld, 51 How. Pr. 25 (1875);,
which the jury may not have, and that
Gould v. Day, 94,U, S. 405,(1870).
they,are the Ipost satisfactory and often
In another, A. sued B. for injury to his
the only' attainable, evidence of the fact
to be proved. * '. ,* The knowledge cattle ,by falling through B.'s wharf,
requisite toqualify a witness to testify and the opihion of a stock-raiser as tqo,
to his; opinion of the value of lands may , the damage done to the cattle was
either be acquired by the performance received: ,Polk v. Cqffn, 9 Cal. 56
(1858) ; and see Snyder v. Western
of official duty, as by a county commis,
sioner or selectman, whose duty it is to
Union R ilroad Co., 25 Wis. 60 (1869).
lay- ou'i public ways, or by an assessor,
III. GoOnS AD C ATTELS.' "Mlarket
whose duty, it is to ascertain the value value," said Mr. Justice STonr, in an
of lands for the purpose of taxation ; or early case' (Alfonso v. United 'States,'2
it may ,be derived, from knowing of, Story 421 (1843) ),, "is necessarily a
sales: or ipurchases of other lands in the matter of opinion as well as of fact, orvicinity, either by, the witness himself
rather of 'opinions gathered from facts..
or by other,persons."
, =
I
iow arecwe to arrive at it? Certainly
t:%ir, LA~zb AND-PRO- not' y the raer'e 'purchase made by a
IT.
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single person, or by purchases made by Rogers v. Ackerman, 22 Barb. 135
a few persons; 'for in either case they (1856); IVIelan v. Lynch, 60 N. Y.
may have purchased above or below the 469 (1875) ; Ilaslins v. lailton
market price, or the market price may
iutual Ins. Co., 5 Gray 436 (1855)
be fluctuating, and the sales too few to Davis v. Elliott, 15 Id. 90 (1860)
justify any general conclusion. Buyers Beecher v. Denniston, 13 Id. 354
may refuse to buy at a particular price ; (1859) ; Irhitney v. T*acher, 117 Mass.
sellers may refuse to sell at a lower 526 (1875); Drapery. Sexton, 118 Id.
price. In this state of things, we must 428 (1875); Tiffany v. Lord, 65 N. Y.
necessarily resort to opinions of mer- 310 (1875). Thus, the question being
chants and others conversant in trade as to the value of a stove, a witne -s
for their opinions, what, under all the acquainted with the value of stoves may
circumstances, is the fair market price testify as to the value of a particular
or value of the goods. The market stove: Smith v. Hill, 22 Barb. 656
price or value therefore must, in most (1856) ; the question being as to the
cases, if not in all, be a matter of fact value of a tavern stand, the opinion of
mixed up with opinion, for it must a witness was admitted: Clark v. Baird,
necessarily include a general price or 9 N. Y. 183 (1853) ; the question
value in the market deducible from being as to the value of materials for
various averages and approximations making clothing, the opinion of a clothand the different qualities of the same ing manufacturer was received : Brownclass of goods. In the next place the ing v. Long Island Railroad Co., 2 Daly
knowledge of the market price being
117 (1867) ; the question being the
thus in fact a matter of skill, judgment value of a house destroyed by fire, the
and opinion, it is in no just sense mere opinions of carpenters werp received:
hearsay; but it is in the nature of the Bedell v. Long Island Railroad Co., 44
evidence of experts." So it is held in N. Y. 367 (1871). So, on the question
a number of cases, that as in the case of the value of lumber used in the conof land, witnesses may express their struction of a house, the opinion of a
opinions as to the value of goods and carpenter is admissible: Simmons v.
chattels: IVh/field v. Whilfield, 40 Carrier, 68 Mo. 416 (1878) ; and on
Miss. 352 (1866) ; Continental As. Co. the question of the value of water ibr
v. Horton, 28 Mich. 173 (1873) ; Lau- milling purposes, the opinions of millers
are relevant : Read v. Bader, 30 N. J.
rent v. Vaughn, 30 Vt. 90 (1858)
L. 378 (1863) ; s. c. 32 Id. 477
lVatry v.Hitgen, 16 Wis. 516 (1863)
(1865).
"The value of commodities is
Brooks v. Hazen, 3 G. Greene 553
(1852) ; Burger v. Northern Pacific usually a matter of opinion, and those Railroad Co., 22 'Minn.343 (1876)
acquainted with an article and its value
Hudson v. State, 61 Ala. 333 (1878)
may express their judgment, their belief,
Gulf City Ins. Co. v. Stephens, 51 Id. or opinion in the matter :" Id.
In
121 (1874); Booker v. Adkins, 48 another case (Tebbetts v. Haskins, 16
Id. 529 (1872); Hood v. Maxwel, 1 Me. 288) (1839), a suit for the value of
W. Va. 239 (1866) ; Vard v. Reynolds, material and labor employed in building
32 Ala. 384 (1858) ; Gonzales College a house, master builders were permitted
v. Mc1i1ugh, 21 Texas 256 (1858) ; to give their opinions as to the expense
Laurence v. City of Boston, 119 Mass. which had been incurred in erecting the
126.; Brackett v. Edgerton, 14 Mian. building. An action was brought for
174 (1869) ; Segfarth v. St. Louis, 6-c., breach of warranty in the sale of a cow,
Railroad Co.,. 52 Mo. 449 (1873)
that she was good and young. The
Thatcherv. Kauchr, 2 Col. 698 (1875);
opinions of witnesses as to whgt the cow
VOL. XXXI.-42
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would have been worth if good and
young, and what she would have been

worth,, provided she gave four quarts of
milk a day, were admitted. " The rule
that a witness must state facts and not
opinions," said the court, " does not
apply to cases like the present. How
else than by the opinions of witnesses
could the difference between an article
delivered and the sample by -which it
was sold be determined ?"1 Joy v. Hopkins, 5 Denio 84 (1847).
And, generally, the value of animals
ma be proved by opinion: J.iller v.
Suth, 112 Mass. 471 (1873) ; White v.
Tlohias, 39 Ill. 228 (1866) ; Rawles
v. James, 49 Ala. 183 (1873); Cantling v. Hannibal, ,'c., Railroad Co., 54
Mo. 385 (1873) ; Anson v. Dwight, 18
Iowan 244 (1865) ; Brill v. Flagler,
23 Wrend. 350 (1840): _1TcDonald v.
Where
Christie, 42 Barb. 386 (1863).
A. sued B. for pasturing his cattle at
different times during the spring, summer and autumn, the opinions of farmers
that it was worth more, to pasture transiently than by the season, were admitted:
Cornell v. Dean, 105 Mass. 435 (1870).
IV. "VALUE oP Sauvicas GExNERIn like manner, the value of
services, in an action therefor, may be
arrived at by evidence'of opinion : tHatton v. W1eems, 12 G. & J. 83 (1841) ;
Lee v. Pindle, 12 Id. 288 (1842) ; Eldridge v. Srmith, 13 Allen 140 (1866)
Kendall v. May, 10 Id. 59 (1865) ; Fitchburg Railroad Co. v. Freeman, 12 Gray
The value of the services
401 (1859).
and labor of a mechanic may be proved
6opinion of another mechanic : lcby the
Collnmv. 'Seivard,62N. Y. 316 (1875)
Sharer v.' Dean, 29 Iowa'144 (1870);
Crawford v. Wolf, 29 Id.'568 (1870)
Eagle, 5c, Aianiif'g Co. v. Browne, 58
Ga. 240 (1877) ; Mercer v. Vose, 40
N. Y. (S. C.) 219'(1875). And 'what it
is worth to put a certain quantity of
lumber into a house may be shown by
the opifiiofi of a carpenter and 'builder:
69 Ill. 581 (1873) ;
Hougk v .Cook,
ALLY.

and see Moore Y. Lea, 32 Ala. 375
(1858). Where a party sued for services
in purchasing a mill for the defendant,
the opinion of a real estate broker, as to
the value of his services, were admitted:
Etting v. Sturtevant, 41 Conn. 176
(1874). And the value of the services
of a bookkeeper may be proved by
another bookkeeper : Scott v. Lilienthal,
9 Bosw. 224 (1862).
V.

VALUE OF SERVIcEs-LAtvYEns.

An ordinary witness cannot testify as to
the value of services performed by an
attorney: Smith v. Kobbe, 59 Barb. 289
(1871) ; Hart v. Vidal, 6 Cal. 56
An attorney, on the other
(1856).
hand, is an expert on this question, and,
therefore, where one lawyer brings an
action onta bill for legal services, it is
the proper and usual mode to call
another lawyer as a witness, and to,
ask him, considering the amount iu controversy, the legal questions involved,
and the importance of the case, what, in
his opinion, is the value of the plaintiff's
services : Ottawa University v. Parinson, 14 Kans. 160 (1875) ; Covey v.
Campbell, 52 Ind. 157 (1875) ; Allis v-,
Day, 14, Minn. 516 (1869) ; Jevne
v. Osgood, 57 111. 340 (1870) ; Ceatral
Branch Railroad v. lVichols, 24 Rans.
243. "The question is one as to which,from the nature of the case, it is not'
practicable to furnish more definite evidence than the opinions of witnesses
who show themselves qualified to formn
well-grounded estimates of such value
by their familiarity with the department
of business in which such services have
been rendered. Services performed by
members of the legal profession in conduieting litigation, fall, we think, within
this principle. There is no fixed standards by which their value can be determined; their value and reasonable price
vary with the magnitude and importance
of the particular case, the degree of
responsibility attaching to its management, the difficulty of the questions
involved, the ability and reputation of
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counsel engaged, the labor bestowed,
and other matters which will readily
occur to the profession. The experience
and knowledge of ordinary jurymen do
not qualify them to form an opinion as
to tie value of services of this kind;
the ease is not one where the opinions
of witnesses should be excluded because
they are no better than the opinions of
the jurymen themselves. On the other
hand, practising lawyers occupy the
position of experts as to questions of
this nature ; from the character of their
Iasiness, they are not only in the habit
of estimating the value of professional
services, but they enjoy peculiar advantages for so doing ; their opinions of
such value should therefore be received,
not only because they are qualified to
form them, but because it appears to be
impracticable to furnish any more satisfactory evidence:" Allis v. Day, 14
Minn. 516 (1869). The lawyer may
give his opinion on the value- of the
services rendered, either from his own
personal knowledge as to what the
services were, or from their extent and
nature as testified to by another witness
in the case, or by the plaintiff himself:
Brown v.fIufford, 69 Mo. 305 (1879) ;
Bedmian v. Plainer, 15 Barb. 550
(1853). Or lie may give his opinion on
a hypothetical ease: lVilliams v. Brown,
28 Ohio St.'547 (1876).

sary," said Jowtsox, J., "that li
should actually have seen or been familiarly acquainted with the trees in question. It was enough that he was acquainted with the fruit business in that
neighborhood, and the value of similar
property there. He was, I think, as
competent to express an opinion in

TespeCt to the value of the trees, after
learning from other witnesses what kind
of trees they were, and the quality and
amount of fruit yielded by them generally, as he would have been to express

an opinion of the value of the fruit per
barrel after ascertaining its condition
and quality:" WA itbeck v. ANew York,
4c., RailroadGo., 36 Barb. 644 (1862).
So, where the plaintiff sued the defendant for cutting down timber on his land,
a witness, from the size and appearance
of the stumps, gave his opinion of the
trees: f-Rantz v: Ireland, 66 Barb. 386
(1873).
And where the question was
as to the value of farming land mortgaged, a farmer living twenty-five miles
from wtere it was situated was allowed.
to give his opinion: Stone v. Corell, 29
Mich. 360 (1874). In Lawlon v. Chase,
108 Mass. 238 (1871), the question was
as to the market value of a peculiar
kind of logs at a certain place, and
the opinion of a witness whose knowledge was adquired by dealing in such
logs for several years at a place ten
miles distant, and afterwards at a place
VI. W
fITNESS
NEED NOT HAVE SEEN forty miles
distant, was admitted. In
TIM PARTICULAR TILxG.
It is not MUish v.
Wood, 34 Penn. St. 451
necessary, to make his opiiiion compe- (1859), an action of trover had been
tent, that the witness should have been brought for the conversion of five trunks
acquainted with the particular thing of clothing belonging to the plaintiff.
whose value he testifies to, or even that The latter described the articles conlie should have ever seen it. Where a tained in the trunks, and then one E.,
railroad company was sued for having a dealer in clothing and fancy goods,
destroyed, by means of fire from its gave his opinion as to their value. It
locomotives, a number of the plaintiffs
was objected that as the witness had not
fruit trees, the opinion of a nursery man seen the goods in question le was not
as to the value of the trees destroyed qualified to speak of their value. But
was admitted, he having previously the court ruled otherwise. "What,"
learned from other witnesses the kind of said Tto)rrsox, 3., "is to prevent a
trees they 'were. "It was not neces- merchant from testifying in corrobora-
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tion of an invoice,' as to values, where
no values -are 'given, when-goods are
lost? , The fact, of the existence or loss
'of the goods is not touched by such
testimony. That remains to be established by,other evidence. I think have
known nnny instances of this kind.! If
a trunk should be packed by a servant
incapable of placing a value on 'the
wardrobe of his or her master or mistress, although ,able to testify to each
article and describe its, quality yet
wholly'incompetent 'to give the ,slightest
idea of the real value of the articles, in
'case-of-loss, howlis the .value to be
ascertained .bat by the testimony of. a
tradesman acquainted with the value
of such articles, based upon a description of them,? So, in regard to furniture insured and lost by fire ; it can
hardly be doubted, but that it would be
competent to fix the value by persons
acquainted with such matters, and competent,, as such, to testify, after its
quality ha been described. If the rule
be that 'only persons who have seen the
articles which have been lost can give an
estimate of their value, then in all the
eases suggested, there would, be a failure
to recover for a loss, or the jury would
be left to guess at their value." In
another case- (Ocr v. -Mayor of ,New
York, 64 Barb. 106 (1872)), an action
was brought against a municipality, for
the destruction of, a floating elevator.
On the question of its value, a witness,
from a description of the property, was
permitted to express an opinion of its
-value. This, on appeal, was held proper. " It is not necessary," said the
court, " that a witness, in speaking of
value, should only speak from actual
observation. Many cases may occur
where, from the destruction of personal
'property, no witness can be produced
-who has had an opportunity to examine
'and 'be conversant with the value. In
such a case, the rule which allows the
next best evidence to be produced applies, and the value may, be ascertained

from, persons lcoriversant with such nchinery, after they, are made, acquaiqtetl
with its condition by the testimony, of
others."
Nor in the case of the market valo
of goods at a particular place is the
opinion of, a merchant acquainted with
that value, inadmissible because he does
not live at that place. Thus, a merchant
at a place of import may give, his ophiion on the market value of particular
goods at the place of export-and that
even in another country, In a case
before Mr. Justice SToRY, in 1843, a
question arose as to the market value of
sugar in Cuba, and that learned judge
admitted the,, testimony of merebant,;
and appraisers of the custom house in
Boston:, Alfonso v. United States, , 2
A witness may give
Story 421 (1843).
his opinion upon the relative value of
two articles, though ignorant of the
actual value of either: Kronscmable 'v.
But
Knobleugh, 21 Minn. 56 (1874).
the value of, logs at one place cannot be
proved by the, opinion of a witness
having no knowledge of values there,
and showing no facts from which it
could be got at as compared with values
elsewhere: *.reeleyv. Stilson, 27 Mich.
153 (1873).
VII. VALUE OF USE OF PROPERTY.

The value of the use of .property as
well as the value of the property itself
may be proved by opinion. In Sturgis v.
Knapp, 33 Vt. 531 (1860), the question in dispute was as to the value of a
railroad during the time it was in the
hands of a receiver. The court admitted
the opinions of witnesses acquainteOh with
the business of the road and the expense
of operating it, saying : "The value of
property, as a general rule, can be
proved only by thu opinions of witnesses:
so too of the value of the use of property,
its value and the value of its use often
depends much upon its location, and, the
circumstances under which it is or may
be used. The use, of property may be
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of much greater value to one person than
it is to another, owing to the skill or
facilities for- its use possessed by the one
that the other has not. To determine
the value of the use of a piece of property to a particular person undfr the
circumstances of a given case often
requires the exercise of much skill and
judgment that can be acquired only by
experience and familiarity with the subject-matter, such a, ordinary triers may
not and probably would not possess." In
Butler v. 21ehrling, 15 II1. 488 (1854),
an action was brougbt for damages for
the detention of property, a number of
horses and other chattels which had been
trained and used for circus purposes.
The opinions of persons who had experience in circus exhibitions were
admitted to prove the value of the use
of the property during that period of
detention. "I In valuing the property
itself," said the court, " but little weight
would be given to one who knew nothing
of the property. But in valuing its use,
those acquainted with the kind and use
of such, property, may be allowed to
testify as to the value of the use of such
property, and such opinions may be
weighed, together with similar opinions
of those who know the property itself."
Thus the question is as to the value of the
use of a horse and wagon. The opinions
of persons who have bought and sold
horses and wagons, and have used such
in their business, are competent: Brady
v. Brady, 8 Allen 101 (1864).
VIII. OPINIONS ON MATTEnS OUTSIbE OccuPATroN. In testifying to the

value of land, the witness' opinion is
restricted to those matters to which, from
his occupation, he is presumed to he
peculiarly fitted to express an opinion.
This limitation is well illustrated in a
recent case in Rhode Island. The owner
of land claimed damages from a railroad
eompany on account of the construction
-o"their line over a part of his property.
A farmer, living in the vicinity, was
introduced to express an opinion as to

2'l

the value of the land appropriated, but
the court refused to admit his testimony,
on the ground that he could only properly
express an opinion as to the value of land
for farming purposes, and the land in
question had another value. "It would
be proper," said the court, " to permit a
farmer living in the vicinity of farming
land which has been taken and with which
le is familiar, to testify whatin his opinion
is its value for farming purposes. A
farmer by his experience and by his
association with other farmers may be
assumed to have peculiar means of information which qualify him to give an
opinion as an expert upon that question.
InI any case, where farming land is taken
an answer to the question so restricted
might afford light, and of course if the
hlnd was valuable only for farming purposes, would be equivalent to the witness
giving his opinion of the saleable or
market value. But many farms in this
state have a value quite independent of
their value for farming purposes. ' For
instance, the value of a farm lying near
agrowing city or village or on the line
of a railroad 'is often 'very greatly
enhanced by the probability that it may
be in demand for house lots. And many
farms lying along INarragansett Bay, are
much more highly pried for their attractiveness as summer resortS than for their
value simply, as farms. And so a farm
may be valned for some other natural or
artificial claims or peculiarity which adds
nothing to it for agricultural purposes.
Values of this sort are just as real as
any other, but they are not such as
farmers are specially qualified to appraise, and therefore to allow farmers
to give their opinion without restriction
whenever farming lands are taken would
be quite as likely to result in the introduction of misleading as of enlightening
testimony,: Brown v. Providence, 4-c.,
Railroad C,.. 12 R. I. 238 (1878). So
the opinion of a farmer as to the value
of goods in a store: Teerpenninj-y. Conmissioners' Exci ange Ins. Co., 43 N.,Y.
279 (1871), or the value of the services
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of a clerk (ramoure v. Caryl, 4 Denio
370 (1847)), is inadmissible.

before the cutting down of the trees and

only $1000 after, he would -ot be
allowed to say to what amount in his
MI. WITNESS CANNOT ASSESS DAVopinion the land had been depreciated.
"The witness," said the court, "canAGES.
While a witness, properly qualified, may express an opinion concerning
not make the subtraction himself, and
the value of an article, it is uniformly declare the result:" Van Deusen v.
held 'that he cannot usurp the functions
Norman
Young, 29 N. Y. 20 (1864).
of the jury and assess damages: Van T. Wells, 17 Wend. 136, decided in
New York in 1837, is a much cited case
Deusen v. Young, 29 N. Y. 27 (1864)
on this proposition. In that case the
MllcGregor v. Brown, 10 Id. 119 (1854);
court say: " The ordinary and in genBenkard v. 'Babcock, 27 How. Pr. 406
eral the only legal course is to lay such
"(1864); Atlantic, 4-c., Rlailroad Co. v.
-facts before the jury as have a bearing
Campbtl; 4 Ohio St. 583 (1853);
Cleveland, 6-c., rdilroad Co. v. Ball, on the question of damages, and leave
them to fi,the amount. They are the
5 Id. 568 (1856) ; Sinclair v. Roush, 14
only proper judges. They are impartial
Ind. 450 (1860) ; Dalzell v. City of
Davenport, 12 Iowa 440 (1861) ; Bruns- and capable of entering into these ordinary matters. Witnesses are, in suclh
wick, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. McLaren, 47
Ga. 546 (1873) ; Evansville, 4-c., Rail- cases, unavoidably governed by their
feelings and their prejudices, gathered
road Co. v. 'Itzpatrick, 10 Ind. 120
from many sources. * * * No case was
(1858) ; Mitchell v. Allison, 29 Id. 43
cited by counsel where evidence of
(1867) ; 'Kiripatrick v. Snyder, 33 Id.
170' (1870) ; Dazell v. City of Daven- opinion, as to the, amount of damages
sustained, has ever been sanctioned as
port, 12 Iowa 437 (1861) ; Russell v.
legal. The amount of indemnity, where
City of Burlington, 30 Id. 262 (1870)
it is not capable of being reached by
Cannon v. Iowa City; 34 Id. 203 (1872);
computation, is always a question for the
Prosser v. Wapello Co., 18 Id. 327
(1865) ; 'Grinnell v. Mississippi, 6-c., jury. If there be any rule without
Railroad C6. '18 Id. 570 (1864) ; Liles exception it is this, and I have been
unable to find any instance where the
v. 'N ew Orleans, Canal, J-c., Co., 11
opinion of witnesses has been xeceived.
92' (1845) : Holland v.
Rob. (La.)
* * * It is no reason for receiving such
Cammett, 5 La. Ann. 705 (1850)
evidence that the defendant may crossRoberts v. C'ommisioners, 21 Kans. 247
examine. That he might do of course
(1'879) ; Bissell v. Mert, 35 Ind. 54
and the trial might thus be protracted to
(1871)'; Hames v. Brownlee, 63 Ala.
an amazing length in taking opinions
277 (1879) ; Simms v. 11onier, 29 Barb.
Where the
from the neighborhood."
419 (1859) ; Dqf, v. Lyon, I E. D.
question was as to the amount of damSmith 536 (1852) ; Tingley v. City of
Proi,idence, 8 R. I. 493 (1876) ; Brown ages sustained by a party through his
'-v. 'Providence, e., Railroad Co., 12 Id. mill lying idle, the opinion of a witness
238 (1878); Nlewton v. Fordam, 7
on this point was inadmissible : Doliffle
So,
Hun 59 (1876); Tompson'v. Dichart, v. Eddy, 7 Barb. 74 (1849).
Thus, where the where the question was as to the amount
'66 Barb. 604 (1873).
of damage sustained by property on
question was as to what damage a certain piece of land had sustained by the account of the maintaining of a nuisance: 1Rsh v. Dodge, 4 Denio 311
'defendant's having cut down a number
(1847), or the putting out of a fire:
of trees which grew upon it, it was ruled
that While a witness, a farmer, might
Simons v. Xonier, 29 Barb. 419 (1859).
In Morehouse v. Mathews, 2 N. Y.
testify that the land was worth $50,000
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514 (1849), an action was brought for
293 (1854)). in many cases the two quesdamages caused by the plaintiff's cattle
tions are identical-the amount of dambeing fed on hay inferior to that which ages sustained depending entirely upon
the defendant had contracted to feed
the question of value. An action is
them upon. A witness was asked what
brought on a warranty of a horse ; the
damage the cattle had sustained thereby,
animal is proved to have such a defect
and he answered that he thought- the
as to amount to a breach of the %vardamages would be about fifty dollars.
ranty. A witness properly qualified to
On appeal the admission of this testi- testify on the subject may give his opinmony was declared erroneous.
"The
ion as to the value of the horse as lie
witness," said SHANI-LND, J., "could
turned out to be and as to Mis value if
have legally testified to the degree of
he had been as warranted.
The jury
are left to make the subtraction, and
inferiority of the hay fed to that agreed
ileresult constitutes the damages in the
to be fed by the defendant. He could
case. But why should not the questibn
also have testified as to the condition of
be : What damages has the plaintiff susthe cattle when brought to the defendtained by reason of the breach of the
ant's and when taken away, and to any
defendant's warranty?
The answer
other fact calculated to enable the court
0
or jury to form a just opinion on the would be precisely the same as to the
previous question, and yet in this form
question of damages; but the mere
the question would be improper, because
opinion of the witness on the amount
it would involve a question of law, for
of damages was entitled to no weight.
If the witness had testified that he was damages is a legal term, and the rule
of damages is in all cases a question of
acquainted with the value of cattle, I
thfilk he might have been allowed to
law. But if the question were so framed
as to call for the difference in value of
state how much less valuable these were
when taken away than when driven to the horse, and nothing more, it should
the defendant's in consequence of the
be no objection to it that the word
was used. It would be
inferior quality of the food." In farger "damages"
v. Edmonds, 4 Barb. 258 (1848), the absurd to exclude the question as calling
opinion of a witness as to the amount
for an opinion as to damages and not
as to value; the difference is merely
of damages sustained by the plaintiff by
verbal. In Rochester and Syraciise
the deprivation or withdrawal of water
from a tavern was rejected ; as was the
Railroad Co. v. Bidlong, 10 How. Pr.
293 (1854), on the injury to the plainopinion of a boat builder in Paige v.
Hazard, 5 Hill 603 (1843), as to the tiff's farm, arising from the construction
damages sustained by a boat negligently of a railroad, the following questions
run down and sunk; the opinion of a were put to a witness:, "What in your
witness in Dunham Y. Simmons, 3 Hill opinion will be the injury to the residue
609 (1842), as to the damage sustained
of B.'s farm, occasioned by the construcby a horse from its being overridden;
tion of the proposed railroad through
the opinions of witnesses as to theamount
it? Wiat'would be the diminution in
of damage that the business of the value of the two fields north and south
plaintiff had sustained by reason of an
of the proposed railroad, by the construction thereof?"
In the Supreme
injury which he had received on the defendant's railroad: Lincoln v. Saratoga, Court these questions were held to be
proper. "These questions," said the
4-c., R. R. Co., 23 Wend. 434 (1840).
But, as pointed out by SELDESZ, J.,
court, "related, one to the whole farm,
in a New York case (Rochester, 4-c.,
and the other to portions of it only. In
Railroad Co. v. Budlong, 10 How. Pr. other respects they were identical. There
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is no difference between an inquiry as to were of the opinion that its value was
the damage or injury which would be decreased from $1000 to $2000. The
done to the land by the construction
jury returned a verdict for $800, which
of the road, and as to its diminution in the court on appeal refused to disturb.
value in consequence of such construc- "From their occupation," said the court,
tion. * * * The idea that opinions are "they (the farmers) had a better oppornot to be received on a question of dam- tunity of estimating the injury and inages is a fallacy. It has arisen from the convenience occasioned to this farm by
fact that questions upon that subject the construction of this road, than mehave been sometimes so framed' as to chanics or persons engaged in other
embrace the legal rule or measure of
pursuits. And in such a conflict the
damages, and at others so as to include jury were justified in giving the prefertoo many particulars upon some of which ence to their testimony:" Jacksonrille,
the jury might be as competent to judge 4-., Railroad Co. v. Caldwell, 21 1ll.
as the witnesses ; or if not, particulars 75 (1859).
which should be given to the jury in
connection with the opinion, to enable
XT. CONJECTURAL OPINIONS. Opinthem properly to estimate its value."
ions must not be based too much on
X. WEIGHT OP OPINIONS AS TO
VALUE.
The opinions of attorneys,

testifying to the value of lawyers' services, however, are not conclusive on
the jury, who may act independently or
in opposition to them, applying to the
case their own experience and knowledge of the character of the services:
Anthony v. Stinson, 4 Kans. 211 (1867).
It is therefore error to instruct the jury
what is the proper compensation is to be
determined from the professional evidence, and not from their own knowledge or ideas on the subject: Head v.
Hargrave, 105 U. S. 45. The same is
true of the opinions of other experts:
Green v. City of Chicago, 97 Ill. 374
(1881). The opinion in the principal
case is in conflict with the principle laid
down in these decisions.
A court on appeal will not set aside
a verdict because the jury have given
preference to the opinions of one class of
experts. Thus, in an Illinois case, there
had been a trial before a jury to assess
damages for a railroad crossing a farm.
Eight witnesses were examined. Ofthese
four were mechanics and engineers who
thought that the value of the land had
been increased by the road crossing it.
The other four were farmers, and they

conjecture. In lWesson v. Washburn
Iron Co., 13 Allen 100 (1866), an
action for a nuisance, a part of the complaint was that the defendants' factory
bad diminished the rental value of the
plaintiff's property. To controvert this,
the defenaants introduced several persons who'had bought, sold and let real
estate in the vicinity for several years,
and were acquainted with its value, and
asked them: " What would have been
the effect of the stoppage of the works
of the defendants upon the value for
occupation of the houses of the plaintiff?" The witnesses answered that in
their opinion, it would have materially
diminished their value.
On appeal this
testimony was held inadmissible. "The
opinions," 'said the court, "were too
speculative and conjectural to be admissible, as coming within the range allowed
to the testimony of experts. It is to be
observed that the question put to the
witnesses was muot as to the actual present value of property, or as to the
extent of damage already actually done
by the acts of the defendants, as in Vandine v. Burpee. But the inquiry was
directed to the probable damage which
would ensue to the plaintiff's property,
in the happening of a contingency which
might never occur."
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So in Burt v. Brigham, 117 Mass.
306 (1875), (and see Fairbanksv. Inhabitanits, 110 Id. 224) (1872), the
plaintiff had filed a petition to assess
damages for land of his which had been
appropriated by the United States for the
purpose of a post-office. On the trial an
expert in the values of land was asked :
" What would be the fair rental value
of the land in question with a suitable
and proper building on it. His opinion
was held inadmissible. "The matter to
be determined by the jury," said the
court, "was the market value of the land
at the time of the filing of the petition.
In estimating that value the jury might
doubtless take into consideration the uses
to which the land might properly be
applied, and witnesses acquainted with the
market value of the land in its existing
condition at that time, might testify to
the fact of what that value was, and
state their reasons for that opinion.
But testimony as to what would be the
fair rental value of the land with a suitable and proper building upon it, related
to matter of opinion as to tife future, not
of present fact, and was too prospective
and indefinite in its nature to be competent evidence of the present value of the
land not built upon." In Kentucky it
has been held that in estimating the value
of a potential right of dower, the
opinions of witnesses are not to be relied
on ; but that standard tables on the subject are better: Lancaster v. Lancaster,
78 Ky. 198 (1879).
XII. COnLICTING RULE IN NEW

HAtPsnimn.

It was early laid down

in New Hampshire that the opinions of
witnesses as to the val6B of land were not
admissible, the court, in the earlier cases,
taking the view that such evidence was
not necessary, as the jury, being freeholders, were sufficiently acquainted with
the value of land in the state to dispense
with the opinion of others: Rochester v.
VOL.XXX.-43

Chester, 3 N. H. 349 (1826) ; Town of
Peterboro v. Town of .Taffrey, 6 Id. 462
(1833).
The proper method was said
to be for the witnesses to testify to the
quantity, quality, location, state of improvement and cultivation of the land,
and leave it to the jury to draw their
own conclusions therefrom. Nevertheless
it was ruled that a witness might testify
as to the market value of a thing at a
particular place-the price that it woulh
cost-this being it was said a matter of
fact and not of opinion: TFpple v.
Walpole, 10 N. H. 130 (1839); Hoitt
v. Moulton, 21 Id. 590 (1850). Neither
can value of goods and chattels be proved
by opinion in New Hampshire: Low v.
Railroad,45 N. H1. 370 (1864) ; Beard
v. Kir, I1 Id. 397 (1840) ; Robertson
v. Stark, 15 Id. 109 (1844). Though
a witness may state the market value
of an article if he is acquainted with it:
Beard v. Kirk, 11 N. H. 397 (1840).
This latter, it is said is speaking to a
fact, while the former is mere opinion,
and opinion too on questions which do
not require any special study and skill
to qualify one to speak of them. But
where the matter is one of art or skill,
and the witness is properly qualified, then
even in New Hampshire his opinion is
admissible. In Hackett v. Railroad, 35
N. H. 398 (1857), the question was
as to the value of certain lumber, and
a witness in the lumber business was
permitted to give his opinion on the subject. "To judge of the qualities of
lumber," said the court, "1is to a great
extent a matter of art and skill peculiar
to those whose business renders them
conversant with matters of this kind.
The opinion of the witness, if he is shown
to possess skill, is in such case properly
admissible."
JOHN D. LAwSON.
St. Louis, Mo.

